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ment since 2015, and shows that these generate, in different ways, a magnification of the mediation work that is central
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1. Introduction
One of the many challenges presented by populism to
its observers concerns its relationship with political rep-
resentation. If “the populist ideology fosters a particu-
lar mode of political representation” (Kaltwasser, 2014,
p. 484), then what do we know about it, at a time when
an increasing number of political projects and regimes
across the world are being qualified as “populist”? In
order to bring elements of answer to this question,
this article analyses the exercise of power by the Aam
Aadmi Party (AAP, Party of the CommonMan), which has
been ruling the city-state1 of Delhi since 2015. The AAP
was born from an anti-politics movement, “India Against
Corruption” (2011–2012), that vehemently denounced
misrepresentation. What happens, then, when this type
of anti-politics movement wins elections?
In an article interpreting the “contending represen-
tative claims” put forward in the 2014 general elections
in India, Niraja Gopal Jayal argues that the AAP’s repre-
sentative claim is a populist one. Indeed she considers
that the AAP and NarendraModi’s Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP; Indian People’s Party) together bring about “a shift
from one dominant type of representative claim to an-
other” (Jayal, 2016, p. 177). Her analysis is based on the
early life of the AAP, a party created in 2012, that success-
fully fought regional elections in 2013, briefly governed
the city-state of Delhi, and fought national elections in
1 In the Indian constitutional architecture Delhi has a specific status: since the adoption of the 69th Constitutional Amendment Act in 1991, Delhi has
been a “quasi-state”, officially called the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD). Like the other 29 states of the Union, the NCTD has its own legisla-
tive assembly and government, but this government is weak because it has no control over three domains that, in this particular case, pertain to the
Central government, namely land development, police, and law and order. The Chief Minister (CM) of Delhi is therefore closer to a city-manager; yet
the centrality of Delhi in India’s political life confers him/her a lot of media attention.
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2014, that timewithout much success. This was a period,
therefore, when the party spent more time campaigning
than governing.
I propose in this article to re-examine the qualifica-
tion of the AAP as a populist party, with a specific focus
on its conception of political representation, on the basis
of fieldwork conducted in the next phase in the life of this
party, what might be called its formative years as a party
of government (and not only of opposition). This period
starts in February 2015 with a massive electoral victory
(the party wins 67 seats out of 70) and is marked by a
series of “institutional improvisations and experiments”
(Kaltwasser, 2014, p. 485), including two new participa-
tory schemes. The analysis of these two schemes, I will
argue, complicates the negative equation between pop-
ulism and representative democracy posed by Jayal.
“Populism” is admittedly a problematic concept, as it
is both overused and contested; but its very ubiquity in-
vites us to engage with its descriptive and analytical value.
The normative use of this concept dominates political
commentary today: “populism” in the public debate is of-
ten thenameof a “pathologyof democracy” (Rosanvallon,
2011; Tarragoni, 2013), a qualification that implies nega-
tive judgement. In the Indian context, this concept was
mostly associated, until recently, to Dravidian parties
(that have been ruling the southern state of Tamil Nadu)—
always in a dismissive manner, to denounce a combina-
tion of personality cult, corruption and demagogy. But
the rise to political dominance of the BJP, since 2014,
has also been analysed in terms of right-wing populism
(Jaffrelot, 2019; McDonnell & Cabrera, 2019).
In the scholarly sphere, populism has been the focus
of growing attention in the past two decades. While a
review of this vast literature is beyond the scope of this
article, I want to point at two broad, and largely overlap-
ping, divides in such scholarship, in order to clarify where
the present article stands.
The first divide concerns the very definition of pop-
ulism as an object of empirical investigation. Many schol-
ars today work with the “ideational approach” proposed
by Cas Mudde, who defines populism as a:
Thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ulti-
mately separated into two homogeneous and antago-
nistic camps, the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’,
and which argues that politics should be an expres-
sion of the volonté générale (general will) of the peo-
ple. (Mudde, 2004, p. 543)
Following the pioneering work of Margaret Canovan
(1999), Mudde (2004) and Kaltwasser (2014) have in-
spired researchers to engage with the study of populism
as a set of ideas that can be investigated through stud-
ies of discourse, rhetoric and claims (see, for instance,
Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). However, other scholars
have analysed populism through a focus not so much on
ideas as on practices, in order to identify the characteris-
tics (and consequences) of the exercise of power by pop-
ulist parties: this is the case of Takis Pappas (2019) who
studies variants of “ruling populism” (p. 82) in Europe
and South America.
The second divide regards the assessment of the re-
lationship between populism and democracy. Canovan
(1999), Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013), but also Laclau
(2007) consider that populism can have a positive impact
on democracy insofar as it “can be both a threat to and
a corrective for democracy”(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013,
p. 168). Indeed populism can be right-wing or left-wing;
conservative or progressive (Bonikowski &Gidron, 2016);
exclusionary or inclusionary (Mudde& Kaltwasser, 2013).
This open stance however is criticised by Pappas, who
defines populism as “democratic illiberalism” and con-
siders that “populist rule leads to liberalism’s decay
and sometimes even to democratic breakdown” (Pappas,
2019, p. 82).
This article asks what the AAP says and does about
political representation; it identifies populist tropes—
including de-emphasising representation—in the party’s
discourse, but also democratic innovations—ultimately
redefining representation—in its practices, thus justify-
ing an agnostic position regarding the relationship be-
tween populism and democracy.
In terms of methodology, the article is based, firstly,
on political discourse analysis, the corpus being com-
posed of a series of “texts and talks” (van Dijk, 1997)
collected between 2013 and 2017: three electoral man-
ifestoes (2013, 2014, 2015); six speeches by Arvind
Kejriwal, the party leader; 24 semi-directed interviews
with cadres, elected representatives and volunteers of the
party, as well as four interviews with NGO workers and
four interviews with bureaucrats working for the Delhi
government (about one fourth of the corpuswas in Hindi).
Secondly, I could directly observe twomeetings organised
in the framework of the participatory devices under study,
and since suchmeetings are often video-recorded, I could
analyse the video-records of another five such meetings.
The article will first consider what the party says, and
then what it does, in terms of political representation.
Thus Section 2 will identify populist tropes in the official
discourse of the AAP, including a de-emphasis on rep-
resentation to the advantage of participation. Section 3
will describe the two main participatory schemes imple-
mented by the AAP government since 2015, and show
that they produce, in different ways, a magnification of
the mediation work that is central to political represen-
tation at the local level in the Indian context. In the last
section I will argue that the party has been developing,
through these participatory schemes, a form of “inclu-
sive representation” (Hayat, 2013) in which inclusion is
linked to mobilization.
2. A Discourse with Populist Overtones and a
De-Emphasis on Representation
The AAP was born from the “India Against Corrup-
tion” movement (2011–2012). As shown by Aheli
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Chowdhury2, even though this movement’s discourse
about politics was so negative that it was considered
as “anti-democratic” by several observers (Chatterjee,
2011), it was also a criticalmoment in the construction of
a new “representative claim” (Saward, 2010) by Kejriwal,
the party leader, and his fellow organisers. The AAP, for-
mally launched inOctober 2012, claimed to enter politics
in order to “clean it from inside”, to “change the rules”,
to “make politics more honest” and democracy more
participative (an idea conveyed through the centrality
of the term Swaraj—self-government—in the party’s dis-
course). In December 2013, the young party contested
elections to the Delhi Legislative assembly, and to every-
body’s surprise came second with 28 seats out of 70, be-
hind the BJP (31 seats) but far ahead of the Congress
party (8 seats). After some hesitation, the AAP decided
to form the government with the support of Congress
Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs). This first
mandate was short: the alliance was a very fragile one,
and the government resigned after only seven weeks.
However, emboldened by its success in Delhi, the AAP
went on to contest national elections in 2014, but won
only four seats. The party then decided to focus again on
Delhi, reinventing itself as the party of good, local, partic-
ipatory governance (Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2014), and when
new elections were organised in February 2015, it won
with a historic majority (67 seats out of 70).
Let us first look at the rhetoric of the party, which
is at its clearest in programmatic texts and talks, i.e., in
election manifestoes and major addresses of the newly
elected CM. Such rhetoric offers at the same time a cri-
tique of democracy as it exists and a demand for a bet-
ter (or more) democracy. As Jayal rightly points out, this
is typical of the “redemptive politics” associated to pop-
ulism (Canovan, 1999). More precisely, one can identify
six populist tropes in the official discourse of the party.
One, the struggle against corruption is central to the
party’s project. Thus Kejriwal (2014), in his resignation
speech, declares:
They say we cannot govern. But in the past so many
years, they couldn’t audit the power companies, we
did it in five days; in 65 years they couldn’t reduce cor-
ruption, we did it in 49 days. We filed a FIR [First infor-
mation Report] against corruption by Sheila [Delhi’s
former CM], Mukesh Ambani [a major industrialist]—
they say ‘govern, don’t do all this’. Come on, acting
against the corrupt is true governance.
Two, in continuity with the anti-corruption movement,
the party denounces political misrepresentation, in ef-
fect challenging, as Petra Guasti and Debora Almeida
put it, “the legitimacy and authority of elected repre-
sentatives” (2019, p. 154). Diagnosing the existence of
a “representation gap” (Huber & Ruth, 2017, p. 462) is
indeed typical of anti-politics movements. The AAP thus
asserts that political leaders, far removed from the ev-
eryday reality of common people, are unable to take the
right decisions:
While our country has achieved a system of free and
fair elections in a minimum sense of the term, the
mechanism of political representation does not offer
meaningful and substantive choices to the citizens,
nor does it provide a level playing field for political
competition. (AAP, 2014)
Three, the governed (the ruled) are opposed to the gov-
erning (the rulers), in a recurrent contrast between the
common man (aam aadmi)/common people (chote log,
janta) and politicians (netas) and bureaucrats (babus):
Swaraj promised nothing short of self-rule: people’s
control over their destiny, power to decide onmatters
concerning their well-being, to direct the apparatus
of power and hold rulers accountable. Swaraj is about
rule by the people, not by netas or babus. (AAP, 2014)
However—and this is a first caveat regarding the populist
nature of the party—it must be noted that the AAP is
not critical of all elites—it does not target judges, jour-
nalists or intellectuals; therefore, it is not so much anti-
establishment as anti-politics (Barr, 2009, p. 4).
A fourth populist feature of the party’s discourse is
that it conceives “the people” as a unified whole—the
differences, inequalities and conflicts among individuals
and groups are practically never mentioned. But at the
same time, and this is a second caveat, the party is not
concerned about the boundaries of such “people”. Its
conception is closer to plebs than to ethnos (Kaltwasser,
2014, p. 480), In other words, the people is here de-
fined by a (dominated) socio-economic condition, not
by culture or identity; there is no “dangerous other”
implied in such notion of “people”, as opposed to the
BJP’s discourse for instance (McDonnell & Cabrera, 2019,
p. 487). Indeed the “socio-economic dimension of exclu-
sion” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 167) is central in
the party’s discourse, suggesting that the “host ideology”
(Huber & Ruth, 2017, p. 466) of AAP’s populism is closer
to the Left than to the Right—even though the party care-
fully avoids conflating the “people” with the poor (only).
In fact, the image of “the commonman”, offered as a sub-
stitute to more specific categories of the popular used
by other Indian parties, such as the poor, Dalits, workers,
etc., signals that the AAP refuses to engage into identity
politics. There is an almost abstract quality of such im-
age of the popular—almost only, because it does, even
if unwittingly, betray the fact that women are strongly
under-represented at all levels in the party.
The party’s rhetoric emphasizes, fifthly, a common
commonness between the people and the AAP govern-
ment; it suggests a consubstantiality that flattens the ver-
ticality inherent in political power, and erases the phase
of conquest of power by the party from its narrative.
2 See her article in this thematic issue.
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Thus spoke Kejriwal (2015), after becoming CM for the
second time, in February 2015:
Delhi again has an Aam Aadmi government…it’s not
mewho has taken the CM’s oath. All of you have taken
this oath. It’s not me who has become Delhi’s CM.
Every citizen of Delhi has become the state’s CM.
However, even though the leader insists that he is him-
self a common man, there is only one leader (Wyatt,
2015). This is another central feature of populism, which
is not explicitly present in the AAP discourse but very
much so in its practice.
Elected representatives, too, must be like the people:
in the relationship between representatives and their
constituents, likeness is preferable to distinction. Thus,
the party repeatedly emphasized its intention to put
an end to “VIP raj [rule], VIP culture” (Kejriwal, 2014).
Moreover—and this is a sixth characteristic of populist
parties (Kaltwasser, 2014, p. 479)—the AAP sees repre-
sentation in terms of an imperative mandate. In 2014,
the party’s manifesto asserts:
AamAadmi Party is contesting elections notmerely to
form the government but to fundamentally transform
the system of governance. We believe that decision-
making power resides with the people and should be
exercised directly by them. In our vision of Swaraj, ev-
ery citizen of lndia would be able to participate in de-
cisions that affect their lives. People will make the de-
cisions and elected representatives would implement
them….Provisions of ‘Right to Reject’ and ‘Right to
Recall’ (will) be introduced. (AAP, 2014)
The emphasis on participation, which is unique, in the
Indian context, to the AAP, rests on the idea that democ-
racy needs be made more participatory in order to be
both more efficient and more democratic. Thus, elected
representatives are supposed to take decisions not only
on behalf of the people and for the people, but also
with the people. What is being proposed is a kind of co-
government. In his first address as CM, given in front of
a huge crowd of supporters in December 2013, Kejriwal
insisted on this image:
Our fight was never to make Kejriwal CM. It was
to hand power back to the people. Today, the aam
admi (common man) has won…friends, we must run
Delhi together. The seven ministers won’t run the
government, officials won’t run the government, po-
lice won’t run it. We’ll evolve a system where all 1.5
crore [15 million] people together run the govern-
ment. (Kejriwal, 2013)
On the whole, while the party has a lot to say about
participation, governance and government, statements
about representation are rare. The rhetoric of the AAP
emphasizes the misrepresentation produced by politics
as it exists, that is, by the other parties; but it also de-
emphasizes political representation in its own vision for
the future, insisting instead on participation. No positive
representative claim follows, as is often the case (Guasti
& Almeida, 2019), the negative claim of misrepresenta-
tion. There is a “prescription for change” (Barr, 2009,
p. 4) but it concerns participation, not representation.
3. Participatory Practices and Magnified Mediation
Looking at what the AAP has been doing since 2015
regarding its promise to develop participation, how-
ever, shows that the relationship between representa-
tion and participation is not a zero sum game. Indeed,
the party implemented two participatory dispositives
that gave birth to new forms of political representation:
themohalla sabhas (neighbourhood assemblies) and the
SMCmahasabhas (School Management Committees’ su-
per assemblies).
The idea of themohalla sabha is that of a micro local
meeting—on the scale of a neighbourhood, i.e., about
5000 people in the context of Delhi—where local resi-
dents will discuss development works required in their
area, and will together decide on a series of priorities
in this regard. Between 2009 and 2015, this idea con-
stantly evolved, as activists became party leaders and
thenministers. From 2013 onwards, a small team of ded-
icated AAP cadres worked at improving its formula so as
to find the right scale, the right frequency, and the right
modus operandi.
A first step towards the institutionalization of themo-
halla sabha was taken in the Spring of 2015, shortly af-
ter the AAP was voted to power for the second time,
through a pilot experiment with participatory budget-
ing. This new experience was first conducted in a limited
number of constituencies (11 out of 70), but all the re-
sources at the disposal of the new government were in-
vested in it. Thus, in each constituency, 30 to 40 mohal-
las were delimited, with a view to have a roughly equal
number of residents, and as far as possible, some socio-
economic homogeneity. In order to organise the meet-
ings in each neighbourhood, two “mohalla sabha coordi-
nators” were nominated by the elected representative,
the MLA. Their role was, before the meeting, to inform
local people and encourage them to participate; during
the meeting they had to moderate discussions between
residents, but also between residents and officials rep-
resenting the various concerned departments (in charge
of water, horticulture, roads, etc.); and after the meet-
ing they were in charge of following up and making sure
that departmentswereworking as per the priorities iden-
tified by themohalla sabha.
On the basis of this pilot experience, the govern-
ment prepared for the next round of participatory bud-
geting (scheduled for September 2016) in a more sys-
tematic manner: new NGOs were roped in to identify
and train 6000 coordinators. In parallel, a detailed map-
ping of local infrastructure was conducted, along with
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a precise identification of the departments and offices
in charge of these various local “assets”. On the basis
of this huge collection of information, a mobile appli-
cation was conceived specifically for mohalla sabha co-
ordinators, so that they could immediately identify the
person to contact in case of an overflowing drain, bro-
ken light bulbs, potholes in the road, etc. This whole or-
ganisation was financially planned for in the framework
of the Swaraj (self-government) Bill, presented by the
AAP as its signature piece of legislation. However, the
Swaraj Bill was never notified, because from May 2015
a peculiar institutional tussle developed between the
Central government, dominated by the BJP and repre-
sented in the constitutional architecture of the city-state
by the Lieutenant Governor, and the regional govern-
ment headed by the AAP, thus severely constraining the
room for manoeuvre of the latter.
Facing the virtual suspension of the Swaraj Bill, the
team of AAP cadres who had been working on mohalla
sabhas then decided to shelve the project and invest
their energy in a domain less dependent on the power of
the Lieutenant Governor: the 1024 government schools
where the children of Delhi’s poorest residents are en-
rolled. Indeed, these cadres saw the SMCs as a poten-
tially significant site for participatory democracy. SMCs
are planned for in the Right to Education Act, an ambi-
tious policy adopted at the national level in 2009 but
badly implemented in most parts of India. The Education
Ministry of the Delhi government decided to take seri-
ously the elections to renew SMCs, due in late 2016. Ac-
cording to the law, each school must have an SMC com-
posed of 16 persons: the school principal; a teacher of
the school; 12 parents elected by other parents; a so-
cial worker; and the MLA, that is, the local elected rep-
resentative. The objective became to give SMCs a cen-
tral role in the government’s project to improve the qual-
ity of schools, through two innovations: firstly, the MLA
was to be represented in each SMC by an “MLA represen-
tative”, nominated by him/her; secondly, several NGOs
were roped in to train the 14,000 newly elected “parent
members” of SMCs, to help organize SMC mahasabhas
(super assemblies), and to follow up work.
SMC mahasabhas are large meetings where the
SMCs of all the government schools of a constituencywill
present their grievances and demands to officials of sev-
eral concerned departments (Education, but also Water,
Police…) in the presence of the local MLA. These ma-
hasabhas, even though they focus only on one sector—
education—and involve only one category of citizens—
parents—clearly are a continuation of mohalla sabhas.
They offer another version of the organised confronta-
tion between citizens and the administration, moder-
ated by the elected representative. However, lessons
have been learnt after the pilot experiment with mo-
halla sabhas, and one can observe the results of organ-
isational learning. For instance, much more attention is
devoted to equipping parent members of SMCs with the
resources necessary for a real dialogue. Thus, each SMC
mahasabha is preceded by a long preparation work that
involves the training of parent members, the repeated
solicitation of bureaucrats, the diffusion of information
in an adequate form, etc. As a result, SMC mahasabhas
have become effective platforms for grievance redress3.
Both the short-lived participatory budgeting and the
more successful SMC mahasabhas have implications for
political representation in Delhi. In both cases indeed
one can observe a redefinition of mediation work, as
such mediation is magnified in two different ways.
Firstly, the role of the elected representative as me-
diator between his/her constituents and the state ad-
ministration, a role considered as essential in the Indian
context, takes on a new dimension because of the pub-
lic nature of the meetings of mohalla sabhas and SMC
mahasabhas. Such meetings are staged in a way that
favourably highlights the central position of the MLA in
between aggrieved citizens and a complex bureaucracy,
as he/she not only monitors the discussion, but also in-
tervenes to remind bureaucrats of their obligations vis-
à-vis citizens. Thus, both mohalla sabhas and SMC ma-
hasabhas have become possible sites for a political per-
formance by the MLA, who both mediates and displays
his/her mediation, as explained by an NGO worker in
charge of preparing SMCmahasabhas:
The SMC sabhas (assemblies) are a fantastic political
platform forMLAs….Because he or she can reprimand
officers in front of the parents, the parents will ap-
plaud, think “he is a tough guy, he is speaking for us”
and most of the time actually the MLA…doesn’t do
much, but the SMC sabha becomes the platform to
show that “look, I care so much”….We don’t mind it
too much, because our work is also getting done, for
us also its important that the departments do get rep-
rimanded…but we are very mindful the fact that it
is a very political platform, it’s a platform that helps
the Aam Admi Party electorally as well. (Interview,
Delhi, 2017)
Secondly, mediation work is expanded through the nom-
ination of “mohalla sabha coordinators” and then “MLA
representatives”. We have seen that in the aftermath of
the pilot participatory budgeting, 6000 MS coordinators
were selected before the whole project was suspended.
And since 2016, around 1000 MLA representatives have
been nominated to take part in SMCs.
Today the latter are active even beyond this specific
participatory scheme: several MLAs told me how their
“representatives” are nominated, trained and involved in
3 The empowerment of school management committees is only one part of the Delhi government’s education policy, that also includes a significant
increase in the budget allotted to the sector, building school infrastructure (classrooms, toilets, etc.) and reforming teachers’ training. This consistent
effort since 2015 has definitely improved outcomes: results for the 2018 exams at the end of class 12 revealed that the pass percentage was better in
government schools (91%) than in private institutions (88%). For a balanced assessment of the AAP government’s education policy, see Dhingra (2019).
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 179–188 183
local governance in a more or less formal manner. It is
important to note that this new character is recognised
by bureaucrats—one of them indeed mentioned “the lo-
cal representative” to refer not to the MLA, but to his
nominee. The use of vocabulary is interesting here: on
the one hand, the elected representative is never called
“representative” (or pratinidhi) by my interviewees, who
will mention only the “MLA”, sometimes the “vidhayak”
(legislator), very rarely the “neta” (leader). On the other
hand, the person nominated by the MLA to represent
him/her, even if he is sometimes named “MLA proxy”
or “MLA nominee” by party cadres, is most often called
“MLA representative”.
The MLA representative is always a party volunteer,
someone who has time to spare for this work and who
will know how to speak to bureaucrats. It’s almost always
aman, either somebody who has a business that can run
without him, or a retired person.
What does he do? In the context of SMCs, his first
function is a symbolic one—he signals that SMCs have to
be taken seriously, as explained by a party cadre:
Parents often feel disempowered…in schools, parents
often could not even enter schools, were turned away
by the guard at the door. What really helped was
the fact that there was a representative from the
MLA’s office (in the SMC), it meant that there is some-
onewho is politically empowered and therefore…they
could help ensure that the governmental administra-
tive structure gives some recognition to these parents.
So if someone is coming fromMLA’s office, theywould
obviously be served tea in the samekindof cups as the
principal, therefore the parents also could be served
in the same plates, so that prevented lots of class bias
that used to exist even in the defunct (SMCs)....I have
heard about how in some MCD [Municipal Corpora-
tion of Delhi] schools, the principal would sit on the
chair and the parents sit on the floor in SMCmeetings.
So the presence of the MLA representative ensured
that there was better treatment of SMCs, because of
theMLA, that is, political empowerment, that gives to
the parents more of a voice. (Interview 2017)
The second function of theMLA representative is towork
on local peoples’ grievances regarding their area:
We solve grievances….Any sort of grievances. Now
MLA’s power lies in specific areas. For instance...there
is Electricity Department, then there is Water Depart-
ment…and Public Works Department [PWD]….So we
deal with all these issues.…Essentially our (mobile)
numbers are with a lot of people, because we are rep-
resentatives in our specific areas and also as a whole
in the constituency. (Interview with MLA representa-
tive, 2017)
His third role is that of a liaison officer: he communicates
information from the MLA to local residents, but also—
and this is significant regarding political representation—
he talks to the MLA on behalf of the residents as
a collective:
Their job is basically a postman, so whatever work is
needed in their area, they will let me know that this is
the high priority work, for example at 1 pm today, we
have ameeting atDelhi Jal Board (WaterDepartment),
so I will go andmeet the officer there. So, seven, eight
volunteers will be available there, so we will be dis-
cussing more the budget that I have got, let’s say 2
crores (20million rupees), and I have works which are
lined up which are 7 crores....So we will all sit and we
will prioritize, let us give 20 lakhs (two million rupees)
to this, 7 lakhs to this, 8 lakhs to this…because I don’t
know what is high priority in different areas. (Inter-
view with MLA, 2017)
Thus the MLA representative is expected to inter-
cede/intervene on behalf not of individuals, but of a col-
lective: either the constituency of the MLA as a whole,
when he acts as proxy of the MLA in a meeting with bu-
reaucrats; or one portion of this constituency, when he
acts as the spokesperson of a neighbourhood in a meet-
ing with the MLA. Because the MLA representative is
somewhat formally given the role of “speaking for” a col-
lective (to paraphrase Hanna Pitkin) we can consider that
he does perform some political representation. However,
the MLA and his/her representative have clearly differ-
ent mandates: while the MLA is an elected representa-
tive, his/her nominee is a delegated one.
AAP cadres present MLA representatives as cru-
cial actors in the party’s project of decentralizing
decision-making. Except in the Education sector, how-
ever, MLA representatives are actors of deconcentration
rather than decentralization. Through the nomination of
his/her 30 to 40 “representatives”, the MLA distributes
power only to party volunteers or supporters; and the
power of each nominee is only, as I said, a delegation
of his/her own power, which makes it very difficult for
MLA representatives to contest the MLA’s vision or de-
cisions. Indeed, all interviewees insisted on the need to
“act”, “solve”, and “get things done”; there was no men-
tion of debates within the group formed by the MLA and
his/her representatives, let alone of dissension.
So, are MLA representatives any different from the
swarm of party workers hanging around party offices
in all Indian metropolises? Beyond their new name,
are they not the same, well known figures of everyday
politics, described in the works of political anthropolo-
gists studying urban India? (See for instance Berenschot,
2010; Björkman, 2014; and Witsoe, 2011). There is obvi-
ously one common feature: just like other parties, the
AAP uses the semi-formal position of MLA represen-
tative to distribute symbolic resources to its support-
ers, i.e., the social prestige that comes from being as-
sociated to the MLA and speaking on a regular basis
to bureaucrats.
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One difference, however, is the tentative formaliza-
tion of the relationship between the MLA and the MLA
representative. There will be a poster put up in the office
of the MLA, displaying the names of his/her represen-
tatives along with their phone number and the depart-
ments of which they are respectively “in charge”. There
can also be a letter written by the MLA, specifically re-
questing a department to accept Mr. X as his/her repre-
sentative, as explained by the secretary of an MLA:
We have here a dedicated team of 20 people, for
electricity issues, MCD issues, PWD issues, Forest De-
partment…this gentleman looks after issues related
to the Delhi Jal Board (Water Department)....This gen-
tleman coordinates with everyone…and MLA has offi-
cially sent a letter to the department concerned, (say-
ing) that “I authorize so and so, his mobile number so
and so, to speak, coordinate and communicate with
our department officials on my behalf on issues re-
lated to (our) Assembly constituency”. He’s given a let-
ter to the concerned Minister and asked “please ad-
vise your officials to cooperate with them.” (Interview,
Delhi, 2016)
This semi-institutionalization of MLA representatives,
this emphasis on a transparent deconcentration of the
MLA’s mediation work, precisely demonstrates a will to
differentiate MLA representatives from the multiplicity
ofmediators that characterises Delhi’s governance (Tawa
Lama-Rewal, 2011) such as partyworkers, “informal lead-
ers”, or the self-appointed representatives of Resident
Welfare Associations.
4. Making Representation Inclusive
Another, more important difference between the AAP
and other political parties is the magnification of media-
tion achieved through (i) its public performance byMLAs
and (ii) its expansion by MLA representatives. In the par-
ticipatory devices described above, elected representa-
tives “speak for” the people, but also with the people,
offering an example of what Samuel Hayat calls “inclu-
sive representation”:
Political representation can be called inclusive when
it enables citizens to fight against exclusion from pro-
fessional politics by acquiring (its) language and by us-
ing it to intervene in decision-making processes from
which they are excluded. This form of the inclusive
use of representation can be designated as the in-
clusion of citizens through their politicization. (Hayat,
2013, p. 119)
The empowerment of SMCs, especially through the
organisation of SMC mahasabhas, is arguably a case
of such “inclusion by politicization”. An NGO worker
who coordinated the organisation of several SMC ma-
hasabhas thus evokes a major, if intangible result of
these meetings:
SMCs don’t just serve as the grievance redressal plat-
form, they are also somehow a means to give people
a sense that the state is listening to them, and that is
something that does not happen in India too often. In-
dians don’t engage too much with the state, their en-
gagement with the state largely happens only during
the election. That is the only time they feel that the
state exists, and state exists for them. Otherwise In-
dians usually see the state as a somewhat repressive,
autocratic power, which they don’t have anything to
do with. But here it is a platform where they see all
the officials who are responsible for whatever their
school is supposed to be running, and here is the plat-
form where they have the power to shout at officials
and tell them that “you have not done your work”, be-
cause when they go to a government office to get the
work done, they are at a position of inferiority and
they are never listened to…but here the official is com-
ing to them, and here is a platformwhich is exclusively
for them. (Interview 2017)4
While SMC parentmembers are formally trained in order
to play their role in an effective manner, MLA represen-
tatives receive more informal (but not necessarily less ef-
fective) “training sessions”, as explained by an MLA:
We do have training sessions, so they (MLA represen-
tatives)…know, basically what are the stages of get-
ting the work done….What will happen is that we
will call them to the officers’ meeting, slowly they
will understand that this is how things will work…like,
these three four people here, they all are party volun-
teers…so they’ll just sit here like a fly on the wall, and
grasp whatever they can. (Interview 2017)
When I asked MLA representatives how bureaucrats re-
acted to their intervention, here is what one of them
told me:
They (bureaucrats) never listened to us because we
were amateurs, you know? When we came in, we
didn’t understand the structure. So the first two years
we learned how to speak to them. We learned how
to get the work done by them. Because they also
slowly realised that we don’t really have any author-
ity over them…but now they don’t want to get into
that mess to be very honest. So work happens. Be-
cause, they know at the end of the day, we can very
much call them and then get the work done. So it is
only going to elongate the time of the whole process.
(Interview 2017)
4 This description suggests that the SMC mahasabha is the latest avatar of the jan sunwai (public hearing), a form of mobilization cum platform for
grievance redressal whose specific emotional dynamics helps “restore the citizenship” of its participants (Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2018).
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Where shouldwe placeMLA representatives in the repre-
sentative system of Delhi politics? The distinction made
by Hayat between two modes of inclusion by politiciza-
tion, i.e., internal and external inclusion, is heuristic:
We will distinguish between internal inclusion, based
on actual mechanisms of representative government,
and external inclusion, which relies on the con-
struction of forms of representation outside the
institutions of representative government. (Hayat,
2013, p. 118)
The difficulty of applying this distinction to the Delhi case
results from—and highlights—the fact that the AAP gov-
ernment has made the boundaries between formal and
informal mediation/representation, and between repre-
sentation and participation, evenmore blurred than they
used to be when the Congress party was in power in the
city-state. Mohalla sabhas and empowered SMCs might
well exemplify “external inclusion”, but the semi-formal
MLA representative is more difficult to categorise. On
the one hand the very concept of “MLA representative”,
that is, “representative’s representative”, implicitly em-
phasises elections as the principal source of legitimacy
(directly for the MLA, indirectly for his representatives).
On the other hand,MLA representatives carrymostly the
informal (but nevertheless important) part of the media-
tion work assigned to the MLA.
This merging of “internal” and “external” inclusion
might be called “inclusion as mobilization”. Indeed, the
representative claim of MLAs, in the AAP, is a mobi-
lizing one. The modus operandi of mohalla sabhas as
well as SMC mahasabhas signifies that the legitimacy of
the local elected representative proceeds not only from
his/her election, but also from his/her capacity to mobi-
lize constituents, to have them participate in the devices
set up by the government. In other words, the MLA em-
bodies popular sovereignty, but not completely; he/she
needs “the people” to be physically present at his/her
sides in order to completely (that is, symbolically as well
as juridically; for a discussion of the differentmeanings of
political representation, see Sintomer, 2013) represent
his/her constituency. As an MLA put it:
We represent people and the premise of our power is
based on the people having elected us, so obviously
even today whenever there is somework which is get-
ting delayed, I can talk to an officer and tell him this
is what the mohalla voted for; there have been in-
stances where I’ve told residents of the mohalla to
come with me for that meeting, so I can put further
pressure on that officer, that “I have these 50 people
from the mohalla sitting over here, outside your of-
fice, please give them an answer.” (Interview 2016)
This conception of the representative as mobilizer is
both a legacy of the past avatar of the party as a (anti-
corruption) movement, and central to a political strat-
egy that could be described as permanent canvassing.
Indeed, the semi-institutionalization of some 3,000 MLA
representatives would obviously consolidate the party’s
presence and visibility on the whole territory of Delhi.
The selection and nomination of MLA representatives
is a way to keep the AAP’s army of volunteers busy,
to reward loyalties, to offer incentives. It consolidates
the MLA’s—and therefore the party’s—hold on the con-
stituency. However political convictions are not neces-
sarily at odds with political compulsions: in this case,
the party arguably wants to mobilize people both be-
cause this will increase pressure on local authorities to
get work done, and because it should be an asset in the
next elections.
5. Conclusion
Seven years after its creation, the AAP is no longer the
“unidentified political object” that it used to be (Roy,
2014), even though it has been, since 2015, in a situation
that is at the same time uniquely favourable (it won 67
seats out of 70 in Delhi) and exceptionally constraining
(its conflict with the Lieutenant Governor has resulted,
since 2016, in near institutional paralysis). I have shown
that the party’s discourse reveals many affinities with
populism, including a denunciation ofmisrepresentation,
and a de-emphasis on representation in a more positive
sense. The promotion of participation both in the dis-
course of the party and in its practices (once it formed
the government) confirms the proximity, underlined by
Margaret Canovan (1999, p. 14), between populisms and
what she calls “participatory radicalisms”—even though
the AAP has consistently valued decision more than de-
liberation, and will more than judgement.
Looking at the two main participatory disposi-
tives implemented by the party complicates the neg-
ative equation between populism and representative
democracy posed by Jayal, who considered that in
its early years at least, the party, while it “formally
accept(ed) the framework of representative democ-
racy…simultaneously work(ed) to undermine it” (Jayal,
2016, p. 178). I have argued that the role given to the
MLA inmohalla sabhas and in SMCmahasabhas, as well
as the semi-institutionalization of MLA representatives,
both magnify the mediation work that is central to po-
litical representation, and reassert that election is the
main (if not exclusive) source of legitimacy. Moreover,
mohalla sabhas and SMC mahasabhas are innovations
that can doubtlessly be called “democratic”, even if im-
perfectly so. Finally, the conception of the elected rep-
resentative as mobilizer is central to a form of “inclusive
representation”.
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